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Abstract
A model of dynamic risk-sharing is constructed where agents meet pairwise
and at random, and there is private information about endowments. Risk shar-
ing is accomplished through dynamic contracts involving credit transactions,
and through monetary exchange. A Friedman rule is optimal, and solutions
are computed. The welfare costs of in‡ation and the e¤ects of in‡ation on the
distribution of consumption and wealth are small for an economy calibrated to
U.S. data. However, these e¤ects are large when the credit system is relatively
unsophisticated.
11. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in information technology have greatly improved our ability to
move information across locations relative to our ability to move goods. Thus, while a
particular transaction might be quite costly in terms of shipping goods or traveling to
another location to inspect goods which are to change hands, the cost of transferring
wealth from buyers to sellers has dropped dramatically. This decrease in transactions
costs is re‡ected in the growth in the use of alternatives tocurrency in transactions. In
the United States between 1991 and 1995, the nominal value of payments by credit
card increased by 81%, and the total nominal value of transactions over CHIPS
and FedWire (electronic interbank transactions mechanisms) increased by 30.1% (see
Bank for International Settlements 1996).
In light of these developments, it would seem useful to develop models which allow
us to study the use of alternative transactions media in environments where com-
munication is sophisticated, but moving goods across locations is di¢cult. Such a
model is considered here. We consider an environment where in…nitely-lived agents
meet bilaterally and at random, much as in the monetary search models of Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1989, 1993), Williamson and Wright (1994), or Trejos and Wright
(1995). Here, in contrast to the typical monetary search environment, information
can be transmitted across locations, so that long-term contracts, interpreted as credit
arrangements, are possible. However, there are imperfections in the transmission of
information which create a role for currency, so that money and credit can coexist.
The motive for exchange in this model is risk-sharing, as in the models studied
in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In this previous work, we used
developmentsin the literature on dynamic contractsunder private information (Green
1987, Spear and Srivastava 1987, Phelan and Townsend 1991, Atkeson and Lucas
1992, 1995, and Aiyagari and Alvarez 1995) to analyze dynamic credit arrangements
2and to model money and credit. The model considered here has much in common
with Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, 1997c), but those setups have no random
matching; i.e. all trade takes place at a central location. Aiyagari and Williamson
(1997a) is a pure credit version of the model considered here, but that other model
has capital accumulation while this one does not. Our approach is related to work
by Kocheralakota and Wallace (1997), which in turn builds on Kocherlakota (1996).
The Kocherlakota and Wallace model primarily relies on a commitment friction rather
than on private information, and they do not compute solutions, as is done here.
In the model, there are two types of agents, those who are risk averse, and those
who are risk neutral. Risk averse agents receive a random endowment each period
that is private information. The endowments of risk neutral agents are constant
over time. Each period, a risk averse agent is matched at random with a risk averse
agent, and goods cannot be transported across locations. Transactions between a risk
averse and risk neutral agent involve currency, and/or a centralized credit mechanism.
Currency is useful because, at random, information can not be perfectly transmitted
through the credit mechanism. Further, risk sharing is limited by the fact that total
consumption of any pair of risk averse and risk neutral agents is limited by the sum
of their endowments.
A version of the Friedman rule is shown to hold in this environment. In particular,
the transactions system works as well with an imperfect credit system and monetary
exchange with de‡ation at the rate of time preference of the risk neutral agent, as
with a perfectly operating credit system. We are interested in computing steady state
solutions, in order to study the e¤ects of in‡ation and the e¤ects of improvements in
the credit system given suboptimal rates of in‡ation.
The main …ndings are the following. In‡ation tends to increase the variability in
consumption, conditional on the level of expected utility (which we might think of as
a wealth variable). This e¤ect occurs as higher in‡ation causes agents to hold less real
3cash balances, so that their ability to insure against income shocks, in instances where
they cannot communicate through the credit system, is impaired. Higher in‡ation
also tends to reduce the variability in expected utilities across the population. These
e¤ects are small for an economy calibrated to U.S. data. In fact, the cost for the
average risk averse agent of eliminating currency entirely (for example by attempting
to engineer an extremely high in‡ation rate) is about 2% of consumption. However,
for an economy where the credit system is very ine¢cient (there is a parameter in
the model which quanti…es ine¢ciency), the quantitative e¤ects of in‡ation on the
distribution of consumption and wealth are substantial, as are the welfare e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is constructed in
Section 2, while Section 3 shows how e¢cient allocations are determined. In Section
4 we study the properties of a benchmark “pure credit” or e¢cient allocation. We
show that a Friedman rule always achieves the pure credit allocation. Section 5
discusses calibration and the computational exercises, while Section 6 is a summary
and conclusion.
2. THE MODEL
The population consists of a continuum of in…nite-lived agents with unit mass. Half






where 0 < ¯ < 1; ct is consumption, and u(¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satis…es decreasing absolute risk aversion. Assume that u(0) = 0 and u0(0) = 1:






where 0 < q < 1; and ct denotes consumption. Assume that risk neutral agents are
more patient than risk averse agents, i.e. q > ¯:2
4Each period, each risk averse agent is matched pairwise and at random with a risk
neutral agent. During the period, goods cannot move between locations (i.e. from one
matched pair of agents to another matched pair), but information can move freely
(subject to some restrictions which I elaborate on below). The mechanism which
governs the transfer of goods between the risk averse and risk neutral agents involves
communication with a social planner at some centralized location. It may help to
think of the social planner in this instance as a …nancial intermediary which performs
commercial banking and central banking functions.
Two types of transactions can occur between risk averse and risk neutral agents;
credit transactions and cash transactions. It will help to imagine that there is a
“credit machine” and a “cash machine” at each location. The risk neutral agent
receives a …xed endowment x at the beginning of each period. She is required (by the
planner) to deposit this endowment for use by the credit and cash machines. At the
beginningof period t, therisk averse agent receives arandomendowmentyt 2 fy0;y1g;
where 0 · y0 < y1: Endowments are i.i.d. over time and across risk averse agents.
Also, the endowment of a risk averse agent is private information. After receiving
her endowment, the risk averse agent …rst accesses the credit machine, which has
been programmed to recognize her, to exchange information (the particulars of which
will be speci…ed below) with her, and to make transfers of consumption goods and
currency contingent on this information. The risk averse agent then accesses the cash
machine, which has been programmed at the beginning of the period to exchange
currency for consumption goods at the price pt (i.e. the price level, which is the same
across all locations).3 Both the cash machine and the credit machine have access tothe
same pool of goods, i.e. the quantity x which was deposited by the risk neutral agent.
We assume that any currency received by the credit or cash machines is destroyed,
and that both machines have the capability of printing currency. Consumption goods
can not be moved across locations, and any consumption goods not consumed by
5the risk averse agent are consumed by the risk neutral agent. We assume that risk
neutral agents do not hold currency, but risk averse agents can carry currency from
one period to the next.
3. EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
The social planner is given Ã0(w0;m0); the distribution of date 0 expected utili-
ties and real money balances (i.e. nominal cash balances de‡ated by p0) across risk
averse agents, and w¤; the initial level of expected utility for each risk neutral agent
(note that we suppose that all risk neutral agents are treated the same). In the
…rst and subsequent periods, risk averse agents would like to carry out transactions,
through the cash and credit machines, in order to share risk with the risk neutral
agents. Credit machines can always identify risk averse agents, according to their
initial (w0;m0); their current real money balances, and endowments that were re-
ported to the machine at date 0 and subsequently. However, sometimes the credit
machine malfunctions and can not receive the buyer’s current endowment report. A
credit machine malfunction occurs with probability ½; where 0 · ½ · 1; and these
malfunctions are i.i.d. across machines and over time. Cash machines, though more
rudimentary than credit machines in that they can not receive ortransmit information
(from/to the planner), do not malfunction. If the credit machine malfunctions, then
the transfer to the risk averse agent from the credit machine can not be contingent
on the risk averse agent’s current endowment. Whether or not the credit machine
malfunctions, the risk averse agent receives instructions (basically, a menu of choices)
from the credit machine concerning how she is to transact with the cash machine. If
these instructions are not followed, in which case this would be revealed by the risk
averse agent’s money balances in the following period, then we assume that su¢cient
punishments are available to the social planner that the risk averse agent will always
follow instructions.
6Currency can be injected and withdrawn from circulation through the cash and
credit machines at each location. Ultimately, of course, standard accounting relation-
ships must hold, and we can think of there being a monetary authority which must
respect the constraint






where ¹ Mt is the money supply per capita, and Tt is the net nominal transfer to private
agents. Alternatively, letting ¹ mt ´
¹ Mt
pt ; !t ´ Tt







That is, current per capita real balances minus per capita real balances in the previous
period divided by the gross rate of return on money must equal the per capita money
transfer to private agents in units of consumption goods.
Now, following the approach in Aiyagari and Williamson (1996) as well as Aiyagari
and Williamson (1997a,b,c), which build on Atkeson and Lucas (1994), we can solve
the planning problem recursively, and as if it were the optimization problem of an
individual risk neutral agent who meets a given risk averse agent forever. To simplify
the problem in this way it is necessary that the endowment shocks of the risk averse
agent be i.i.d., but it is not necessary that the “risk neutral agent” be risk neutral.
We con…ne attention to steady states, where °t = °; and !t = ! for all t; where
° and ! are constants. Also, the distribution of expected utilities and real money
balances across risk averse agents, Ã(w;m); is constant in the steady state. We
suppose that the social planner treats the price path fptg1
t=0 as given, and con…ne
attention, as indicated, to the constant in‡ation case. We will subsequently address
how the planner chooses ° optimally.
As is common in dynamic contracting problems, the expected utility, w; of the
risk averse agent serves (though here only partially) as a summary statistic of the
agent’s period 0 level of expected utility and all subsequent reports (through the
7credit machine) of the agent’s endowments. Here, we also need to include the risk
averse agent’s real cash balances, m; as of the beginning of the period, in order to
impound all the relevant information. We can think of (w;m) as summarizing the
risk averse agent’s asset portfolio, where w can be interpreted as a credit balance. In
a steady state, the planner’s problem can be speci…ed in recursive form in terms of
the following Bellman equation, where the function v(w;m) is the maximum level of
expected utility of a risk neutral agent who is paired with a risk averse agent with an
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(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿i(w;m) ¡ °m1i(w;m)) + ¯w1i(w;m) (4)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m+ ¿j(w;m) ¡°m1j(w;m)) + ¯w1j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
(1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m)) + ¯w0i(w;m) (5)
¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(yi + m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0j(w;m)) + ¯w0j(w;m); (i;j) = (1;0);(0;1);
8¿i(w;m) · x; i = 0;1; (6)
¿(w;m) · x
x ¸ m + ¿i(w;m) ¡°m1i(w;m) ¸ ¡yi; i = 0;1 (7)
x ¸ m + ¿(w;m) ¡ °m0i(w;m) ¸ ¡yi; i = 0;1
mij(w;m) ¸ 0; i;j = 0;1: (8)
w;wij(w) 2 [w; ¹ w]; i;j = 0;1: (9)
where w= ¼u(y1¡y0) and ¹ w = ¼u(y1+x)+(1¡¼)u(y0+x): In the problem above, the
planner chooses ¿i(w;m), the transfer the risk averse agent receives from the credit
machine when it does not malfunction, when the risk averse agent’s endowment is
yi; ¿(w;m); the transfer from the credit machine when the machine malfunctions
(note that this transfer can not be contingent on the risk averse agent’s endowment);
wij(w;m); the risk averse agent’s expected utility in the next period when the credit
machine is in mode i (i = 0for malfunction) and the buyer’s endowment is yj; and
mij(w;m); the buyer’s quantity of real cash balances at the beginning of the next
period, with subscripts de…ned similarly. Here, (3) is a promise-keeping constraint,
and (4) and (5) are incentive constraints. The resource constraints at the credit ma-
chine and cash machine are given by (6) and (7), respectively.4 These are constraints
on the net transfers from the credit and cash machines given by the nonnegativity
constraints on the consumption of risk averse and risk neutral agents. The inequal-
ities (8) are nonnegativity constraints on real cash balances, and (9) are constraints
on expected utility promises, where w is the lowest level of expected utility which it
is incentive compatible for the planner to force on any risk averse agent, and ¹ w is
the highest possible level of expected utility, which results from the risk averse agent
receiving the total endowment of the pair of agents in perpetuity.
9Now that we have a recursive representation of the planner’s problem, we can
proceed to an analysis of steady state e¢cient allocations. We can think of solving
for the steady state by …rst solving (2) subject to (3)-(9) to obtain v(w;m); and
optimal transfers, expected utility promises, and real cash balance recommendations.
This then implies a dynamic stochastic path for (w;m) and we can accordingly solve
for Ã(w;m); the steady state distribution of expected utility entitlements and real
cash balances across buyers.
As in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b), it is straightforward to show that the
problem (2) subject to (3)-(9) essentially collapses into a single-state-variable prob-
lem. That is, we can show that the value function takes the form
v(w;m) = ¡(1 ¡ q)m+ µ(w);
whereµ(¢) isa function, and we can performthechange of variables¿¤
i (w) = ¿i(w;m)¡
m; ¿¤(w) = ¿(w;m) ¡ m; w¤
ij(w) = wij(w;m); and m¤
ij(w) = mij(w;m): Then, the
choice variables in the optimization problem (the variables with * superscripts) are in-
dependent of m:5 Therefore, the risk neutral agent’s current consumption allocation,
future real cash balances, and future expected utility entitlement, are determined
only by the current expected utility entitlement and the current endowment. Clearly,
this simpli…cation will be important in computing solutions.
4. A PURE CREDIT ECONOMY
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider the special case where ½ = 1;so that cash
machines are never used. That is, given that credit machines never malfunction, any
transfers that can be achieved through the cash machine can be done at the credit
machine, and with more information. Thus, cash machines are redundant, and we
can think of this as a setup where money is not valued. The recursive problem for
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w = (1 ¡ ¯)
·
¼u(y1 + ¿1(w)) + (1 ¡¼)u(y0 + ¿0(w))
¸
(11)
+¯[¼w1(w) + (1 ¡¼)w0(w)]
(1 ¡ ¯)u(y1 + ¿1(w)) + ¯w1(w) ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(y1 + ¿0(w)) + ¯w0(w) (12)
(1 ¡ ¯)u(y0 + ¿0(w)) + ¯w0(w) ¸ (1 ¡ ¯)u(y0 + ¿1(w)) + ¯w1(w) (13)
x ¸ ¿i(w) ¸ ¡yi; i = 0;1 (14)
w;wi(w) 2 [w; ¹ w]; i = 0;1: (15)
Here, z(w) is the value function, ¿i(w) is the transfer to the risk averse agent through
the credit machine when the buyer’s endowment is yi; and wi(w) is the future expected
utility promise made to the risk averse agent when her endowment is yi: Equation
(11) is the promise-keeping constraint, (12) and (13) are the incentive constraints,
(14) are the resource constraints, and (15) describe the upper and lower bounds on
expected utilities, with w and ¹ w de…ned as before.
The steady state allocation de…ned above is identical to the one analyzed in Aiya-
gari and Williamson (1996). In that paper, we showed that the steady state allocation
was e¢cient, and that there exists a unique limiting distribution Ã(w) which exhibits
mobility. It is straightforward to show, following Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b),
that when ½ 6= 1; ° = q is optimal, i.e. a Friedman rule which drives the nominal
interest rate to zero achieves the e¢cient allocation (i.e. the pure credit allocation).
We can prove this by showing that, when ½ 6= 1; and ° = q, the problem (2) subject
to (3)-(9) is equivalent to (10)-(15).
115. CALIBRATION AND COMPUTATION
From Section 4, we know that a Friedman rule result holds in this economy so
that, even if the credit system is imperfect (i.e. ½ < 1) the correct monetary policy
can make up for this completely. What we would now like to investigate, is how
wrong things can go when the monetary growth rate is suboptimal in the steady
state, solving the planner’s problem for a given suboptimal °. In particular, in this
section we will investigate the quantitative e¤ects of in‡ation for a given value of ½
(i.e. …xing the credit friction), and the e¤ects of increasing ½ with the in‡ation rate
…xed.
The …rst step is to calibrate the model by choosing functional forms and reasonable
parameter values. The utility function I use is u(c) = 1 ¡ e¡®c; with ® = 1; which
implies a coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of unity at the mean endowment (which
will be unity). A constant absolute risk aversion utility function is convenient for
computational purposes in this model as it is bounded. We interpret a period as one
quarter, and set y0, y1; and ¼ so as to match the variability in quarterly household
income. Using PSID data, Aiyagari (1994) argues that a …rst-order autoregression
closely matches the time series properties of annual earnings, with a range of .23 to
.53 for the …rst-order serial correlation coe¢cient, and a coe¢cient of variation in
unconditional earnings of 20 to 40 percent. Since it is not tractable to introduce
serial correlation in endowments for risk averse agents, we must do the best we can to
…t an i.i.d. endowment shock in the model to the data. This is not too problematic,
as the estimated serial correlation in annual data is low, and serial correlation for
quarterly data would then be even lower. If we take the coe¢cient of variation to
be 30 percent for annual data, then if quarterly income is i.i.d., the coe¢cient of
variation for quarterly data would be 60 percent. Thus, we set ¼ = :5; y0 = 1¡²; and
y1 = 1 + ²; with ² = :6: The remaining parameters are ¯; q; ½; and °: We assumed
12at the outset that q > ¯; which is required for there to exist a limiting distribution
of expected utilities with mobility.6 We want the average discount factor across the
population to be consistent with a quarterly interest rate of 1%, as in the real business
cycle literature (Prescott 1986), so we then have
q+¯
2 = :99: Then, as a convenient
benchmark, we let q = :99 + º and ¯ = :99 ¡ º; and then …nd the value of º such
that, in the steady state, the risk neutral agent is indi¤erent between autarky and
the steady state allocation. That is, the risk averse agents receive all the gains from
trade in the steady state for the calibrated set of parameters. The parameter ½ is
then set so that the model matches the available evidence on the use of currency
relative to cash alternatives in transactions. A survey of households by the Federal
Reserve (Avery, Elliehausen, Kennickell, and Spindt 1987), conducted in 1984, found
that 24% of the value of transactions is carried out in currency. In the model, the
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We want to set ½ so that
Tc
Tc+Tnc = :24: When the Federal Reserve survey was done, the
in‡ation rate was approximately 1% per quarter, so we set ° = 1:01 for calibration
purposes.
Solutions were computed as follows. First, grids were chosen for the two state
variables, w and m: The lower bound on the expected utility of the risk averse agent
is ¼u(y1 ¡ y0) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(0); which is the minimum incentive compatible level of
expected utility that can be imposed on a risk averse agent, and the lower bound on
m is zero. The upper bound on expected utility is ¼u(y1+x)+(1¡¼)u(y0+x): Since
choice variables in the planner’s problem are independent of m; it is only necessary
13to solve the problem at each point along the w grid, and for a single value for m; say
m = 0; and then use this solution to determine what the solution is for all points on
the grid. We make an initial guess for the function µ(w); and then use value iteration
to arrive at the solution for µ(w). At each iteration, µ(w) is updated by …tting a
third-order Chebychev polynomial (plus an additional term,
1
1¡w; which performed
well in …tting the value function), to the values computed for the value function at
points on the grid on the previous iteration. When convergence is achieved, then the
decision rules are interpolated across a …ner grid, and a matrix of Markov transition
probabilities for the state w is constructed as an approximation using a lottery over
the two closest grid points. A limiting distribution over w is then computed.
To match the real interest rate and the evidence from the Federal Reserve survey
on household transactions, we set q and ¯ very close to :99 (i.e. º is very small, on the
order of 10¡5; in the steady state to achieve the desired split of the surplus between
risk neutral and risk averse agents), and ½ = :81:
E¤ects of In‡ation With Parameters Set at Calibrated Values
We …rst consider the e¤ects on the steady state for parameters calibrated to the
U.S. economy, as described above. The results are in Figures 1 through 4, and Table
1. Figures 1 and 2 show results for the pure credit economy, which as we have shown
is equivalent to the Friedman rule economy (q = °) for any ½:
In Figure 1, consumption pro…lesin the high and lowincomestate fortherisk averse
agent are plotted against w; expected utility. Note that, conditional on expected
utility, there is very little variability in consumption, at least for the middle range of
expected utilities. Near the upper bound on expected utilities, however, the pairwise
resource constraint (14) binds, i.e. achieving something close to full insurance for
the risk averse agent would require more consumption goods in the low income state
than the risk averse agent and the risk neutral agent have between them. Also, near
14the lower bound on expected utilities, insurance against the income shock for the risk
averse agent is poor, as the lower bound on expected utilities (15) binds. That is,
due to the fact that the lower bound on expected utilities restricts possible future
penalties, there must be a larger gap between current consumption in the high-income
and low-income states to induce truth-telling.
Figure 2 shows the limiting distribution of expected utilities in the pure credit econ-
omy. The bimodal feature of the distribution is associated with the binding pairwise
resource constraints, a characteristic which makes the allocation problem here di¤er-
ent from one in an environment where all agents meet in one location. The limiting
distributions studied in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, c) tend to be unimodal.
It is di¢cult to give clear intuition for why the binding resource constraints create
a tendency toward bimodal limiting distributions other than to point out that the
binding resource constraint for high w works through the binding incentive constraint
(for the agent with high income) to alter the law of motion for w in such a way that
agents near the mean of the distribution will drift either up or down, while agents
with high w tend to drift down and those with low w drift up. Note that, comparing
Figures 1 and 2, a signi…cant fraction of risk averse agents will face binding resource
constraints (and therefore poor consumption smoothing) for high w; but a negligible
fraction of agents su¤er poor consumption smoothing for low w:
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Now we examine how in‡ation a¤ects the steady state, …xing ½ at its calibrated
value, ½ = :81: In Table 1, the entries in the rows are, respectively, annualized in-
‡ation rates, the mean expected utility in the steady state of risk averse agents, the
standard deviation of expected utility for risk averse agents, the standard deviation
of consumption for risk averse agents, the fraction of the value of total transactions
accounted for by currency, a measure of the distance between the Friedman rule
15(-3.94% annual in‡ation) steady state distribution of expected utilities and the com-
puted steady state distribution of expected utilities for risk averse agents (described
in more detail below), the welfare cost of in‡ation as a fraction of consumption for
the average risk averse agent, and a similar measure for the risk neutral agent. The
welfare costs to each type of agent in rows 7 and 8 of Table 1 are measured in a
conventional way. For the risk averse agent, we want to compute what the average
risk averse agent would pay, in units of consumption, to live in the Friedman rule
economy in row 1 of Table 1, rather than the economy with that particular in‡ation
rate. We then express the welfare change in units of consumption relative to average
consumption in the Friedman rule economy. That is, if UF (US) is expected utility of
the average risk averse agent in the Friedman rule (suboptimal) economy, then given






: For the risk neutral agent, the corresponding welfare measure
(in row 8) is just the change in average consumption for risk neutral agents, divided
by consumption in the Friedman rule economy.
What is called a “welfare cost” in row 6 of Table 1 is a measure of the distance
between the Friedman rule distribution and the relevant suboptimal distribution of
expected utilities for risk averse agents. It is useful to look at this measure, as there
can be e¤ects of in‡ation on the distribution which will not show up in changes in the
mean. Since for the distance measure we use it is necessary that limiting probabilities
be bounded away from zero, we use a kernel estimation technique (Silverman 1986) to
derive an estimated limiting density function for the expected utilities of risk averse
agents. That is, we estimate the density function f(x) associated with the limiting










where h is the “window width,” pi is the limiting probability associated with expected
16utility level wi; n is the number of grid points for expected utilities, and K(¢) is a
probability density function. For K(¢); we used the standard normal density function.
Choosing a grid for x; we let fj = f(xj) for j = 1;2; :::; `; and then compute the





where g(x) denotes the limiting distribution under a Friedman rule. This distance
measure is adapted from an approach in information theory used by Kullback (1959).
The primary e¤ect of an increase in the in‡ation rate is to reduce the average
quantity of real cash balances held by each risk averse agent. As a result, these agents
are less capable of smoothing consumption when they can not use the credit machine
to smooth consumption given their income shock. Thus, conditional on expected
utility, the variability of consumption should increase, but given that the incentive
structure is also a¤ected, there will be a change in the steady state distribution of
expected utilities. Table 1 shows that the mean level of expected utility for risk averse
agents decreases with in‡ation, while the standard deviation of expected utilities …rst
increases and then falls. The standard deviation of consumption across risk averse
agents decreases and then increases with in‡ation. The e¤ects on welfare are quite
small, as shown by rows 7 and 8 of Table 1. In particular, the cost of driving money
out of the system completely, which would occur if an in‡ation rate in excess of about
2,000% per annum were attempted, is only about 2% of consumption for the average
risk averse agent (see column 5 of Table 1). Thus, the costs of in‡ation here are
an order of magnitude lower than the costs calculated by Cooley and Hansen (1989)
for a real business cycle model with a cash-in-advance constraint. The di¤erence in
welfare costs is primarily due to the fact that there is an alternative in this model
to making transactions with cash whereas there are no such alternatives in cash-in-
advance or related representative-agent approaches to monetary analysis. Further,
17there are no e¤ects of in‡ation on labor-leisure choice (Cooley and Hansen 1989),
growth (Dotsey and Ireland 1996), or the costs of credit (Lacker and Schreft 1996).
In Table 1, the fraction of the value of transactions using currency falls with in‡ation,
but not markedly so for low rates of in‡ation. In moving from a Friedman rule to a
10% in‡ation, the percentage of transactions involving currency drops only a small
amount, from 24.5% to 23.8%.
Figures 3 and 4 show consumption pro…les given ½ = :81 and 10% annual in‡a-
tion. Figure 3 shows consumption in the high (c11) and low (c10) income states
when the risk averse agent is able to smooth consumption through the credit system,
while Figure 4 shows the corresponding consumption pro…les when the agent smooths
consumption by using money. Under the Friedman rule, Figures 3 and 4 would be
identical, but here we can see the e¤ect of a moderate in‡ation in increasing the vari-
ability of consumption, conditional on expected utility, in Figure 4. Figure 5 shows
the di¤erence between the Friedman rule limiting distribution and the limiting dis-
tribution when money is driven out of the economy. The “eyeball distance” between
the two distributions seems small, which is consistent with the small welfare costs of
in‡ation in rows 7 and 8 of Table 1. This tells us that, in terms of the “welfare cost”
in row 6 of Table 1, 3 is a small number. This will be useful as a benchmark for the
next section.
In‡ation In an Economy with a Poor Credit System
In the previous section, with parameters calibrated to U.S. data, the welfare e¤ects
of in‡ation and the social value of currency were very small. Further, given that
most evidence (see for example Bank for International Settlements 1996) indicates
that non-cash transactions media have seen increased use in the U.S. relative to
currency recently, these costs should be viewed as upper bounds. However, it would
be useful to know how in‡ation a¤ects an economy where the payments system is less
18sophisticated. In the model, ½ measures the e¢ciency of the payments system, and
in this section we will replicate the computational exercises of the previous section
for an economy identical in all respects, except that ½ = :05; an arbitrarily-chosen
number close to zero. Note that if ½ = 1 then the credit system works perfectly and
money is not valued, while if ½ = 0 transactions using cash are the only means for
smoothing consumption in the face of idiosyncratic shocks to income.
[Insert Table 2 here.]
The entries in Table 2 correspond to those in Table 1. Note in particular that the
welfare costs of in‡ation, in terms of the e¤ects on the risk averse agent, are much
larger in Table 2 than in Table 1. The much larger numbers in row 6 of Table 2
indicate that in this economy in‡ation induces much more pronounced e¤ects on the
distribution of expected utilities across risk averse agents. Also, in row 7 of the table,
the welfare e¤ects on the average risk averse agent are also much larger, to the point
where the average risk averse agent would be willing to give up almost 7% of average
consumption to live in an economy with a Friedman rule rate of in‡ation, rather than
an economy without currency (as compared to about 2% in Table 1).
Note also that, in row 3 of Table 2, the standard deviation of expected utilities for
risk averse agents drops dramatically at high rates of in‡ation. Figure 6 shows the
distributions of expected utilities corresponding to the Friedman rule economy and
the economy where money is not held. Here, when there is no currency (but the need
for it is great), there is not only a large decrease in the dispersion of expected utilities
across risk averse agents, but the distribution also becomes unimodal rather than
bimodal. This is due mainly to the fact that the decrease in dispersion implies that
the resource constraint in the planner’s problem (7) does not bind. As was mentioned
earlier, this constraint will tend to bind only for high values of w; and if it binds this
tends to produce a bimodal distribution of expected utilities.
19In row 4 of Table 2, the e¤ect of in‡ation on the variability in consumption is non-
monotonic, re‡ecting the e¤ects of two opposing forces. The …rst force is due to the
fact that higher in‡ation tends to increase the variability in consumption given the
level of expected utility, since risk averse agents are less able to smooth consumption
with lower cash balances. The second force is that the variability in consumption will
tend to fall as the variability in expected utilities falls, since average (across income
states) consumption increases monotonically with w: For low rates of in‡ation the
second e¤ect dominates, while for high rates of in‡ation the …rst does.
Perhaps surprisingly, the fraction of the value of transactions accounted for by
currency (row 5 in Table 2) increases with the in‡ation rate at low levels of in‡ation,
and then decreases. There are two opposing forces at work here. First, in‡ation has a
tendency to decrease real cash balances conditional on expected utility, for each risk
averse agent. As a result, given the distribution of expected utilities across risk averse
agents, money is used less in transactions as the in‡ation rate increases. The second
e¤ect is related to the fact that the distribution of expected utilities changes with
in‡ation. When w is high, the resource constraint (7) tends to bind, which implies
that there is a sense in which risk averse agents can not purchase all the goods they
want given prices. They know this in advance, when they visit the credit machine,
and therefore tend to get less currency than otherwise to make purchases from the
cash machine. This problem becomes more acute as w approaches its upper bound,
where there will be no currency transactions even if the credit machine malfunctions.
An increase in the in‡ation rate tends to reduce the dispersion in the distribution
of expected utilities which then causes the fraction of risk averse agents whose cash
purchases are constrained to decrease. This then has the e¤ect of tending to increase
the average quantity of money held, and the quantity of monetary transactions for
the population as a whole. At low rates of in‡ation, the second e¤ect dominates,
while the …rst e¤ect dominates at high rates of in‡ation.
206. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have studied a random matching model with private information in which risk
averse agents insure against idiosyncratic income shocks through long-term credit
arrangements and by holding money. The credit system is imperfect in that, at
random, agents may not be able to communicate fully with the centralized credit
agency. In spite of this imperfection, the transactions system will work perfectly,
i.e. the steady state allocation is e¢cient, if the quantity of money is governed by a
Friedman rule, with de‡ation at the rate of time preference of the risk neutral agents
in the model. Solutions to the model were computed to determine the quantitative
e¤ects of suboptimal money growth, …rst in an economy calibrated to U.S. data, and
second in an economy with a relatively unsophisticated credit system. In general, the
variability in consumption, conditional on the level of expected utility at the beginning
of the period, tends to increase with in‡ation, and the variability in expected utilities
across thepopulation tends to decrease. In the…rst case, the welfare e¤ects of in‡ation
are quite small, but these welfare e¤ects increase dramatically in the second case
where cash transactions are much more important.
The primary di¤erence between thismodel and the ones in Aiyagari and Williamson
(1997b,c) is the randommatching feature, so it would be useful at this point to discuss
how randommatching matters forthe solution to the problem, and its implications for
the results. In some random matching models, for example the absence-of-double-
coincidence monetary environments studied by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993),
random matching not only restricts how goods may move among economic agents; it
makes more palatable the assumption that information does not ‡ow between pairs
of would-be trading partners, or over time. In our environment, as in models studied
by Kocherlakota (1996), Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a), and Kocherlakota and
Wallace (1997a), information does ‡ow across locations (though perhaps with some
21friction which provides a role for money), which permits a role for credit arrange-
ments. Now, the fact that information is communicated to a central location in our
model implies that the problem solved by a social planner here is much like the prob-
lems solved in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b, c) in environments where all agents
meet in a central location. There are two primary di¤erences here implied by ran-
dom matching. First, random matching implies a resource constraint on pairwise
allocations. Clearly if the constraint binds, it matters, and solutions were computed
in the paper where this constraint was binding (and mattered in a big way for the
resulting allocation) and where it was not. Second, solutions are computed as if there
were a social planner associated with each level of expected utility of the risk averse
agent, with all these planners trading on a bond market at a …xed interest rate. This
…xed interest rate is the discount rate for the risk neutral agent. In Aiyagari and
Williamson (1997b, c), we study economies with an endogenous interest rate, while
Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a) is an endogenous interest rate economy with ran-
dom matching and capital accumulation. We did not follow Aiyagari and Williamson
(1997a) in allowing capital accumulation, as the approach here is somewhat less com-
putationally taxing, and because the form of capital accumulation in Aiyagari and
Williamson (1997a) would not add a great deal of additional insight.7
Dealing with some types of commitment issues in this random matching envi-
ronment could be somewhat di¢cult, though it would be straightforward to permit
reversion to autarky here, as in Kocherlakota and Wallace (1997). Perhaps more
interesting are the commitment issues examined in Aiyagari and Williamson (1997b),
where agents can abandon long-term credit arrangements but are still able to trade
on a competitive money market. In that type of environment, a Friedman rule is no
longer optimal, as higher in‡ation improves incentives by causing a decrease in the
value of defecting.
This model might besuccessfully applied to otherpayments systemissues, asspatial
22separation and the ‡ow of information seems key to the analysis of such issues (see
also Freeman 1996, 1997). For example, the random matching environment might
lend itself to the study of the optimal design of payments systems subject to systemic
risk. Consumers might write long-term contracts with …nancial intermediaries at
spatially dispersed locations, with costly communication between these intermediaries
and some central agency through which settlement might be made. Now, suppose
there were some risk associated with each …nancial intermediary and its ability to
meet its obligations through the centralized settlement mechanism. We might then
ask how individual intermediaries would trade o¤ the costs of communication and
settlement against the costs associated with bearing system-wide risk, and whether
they would choose to make this tradeo¤ in a socially optimal way.
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26FOOTNOTES
1. Discussions with Rao Aiyagari were an important input for this paper. I thank
Ed Green and participants at the Conference on Comparative Financial Systems
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and the Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking.
2. This is required to generate limiting distributions of wealth which exhibit mo-
bility.
3. It is a technological requirement that prices be the same across cash machines in
di¤erent locations. The machines simply can not be programmed in any other
way.
4. Note that I have ignored the resource constraint at the credit machine that
states that the risk averse agent can not transfer more than her endowment
plus her money balances at the beginning of the period to the credit machine.
This constraint would be redundant, as (7) implies that it holds.
5. Note that (6) will not bind at the optimum, since we will have mij(w;m) = 0 for
(i;j) = (0;0); (1;0); (1;1): If these constraints were binding, then the problem
would not collapse to a single-state-variable problem.
6. In this model,
1
q ¡ 1 plays the role of an interest rate, in terms of how the
allocation is computed. In related models with an endogenous interest rate, for
example Atkeson and Lucas (1994), and Aiyagari and Williamson (1997a,b,c),
the interest rate is typically larger than the discount rate, as we have essentially
assumed here.
7. The additional mileage would be minimal as capital accumulation in Aiyagari
and Williamson (1997a) is a device for achieving an endogenous interest rate
27with q > ¯;which then implies that there is a steady state limiting distribution
with mobility. The model is set up in such a way that capital accumulation deci-
sions are independent of the problem determining the allocation of consumption
goods at each location.
28Table 1: ½ = :81
Annual In‡ation Rate -3.94% 10% 100% 1500% >non-mon. threshold
Mean Exp. Utility .6092 .6081 .6063 .5981 .5967
S.D. of Exp. Utility .1411 .1415 .1418 .1408 .1406
S.D. of Consumption .3738 .3669 .3680 .4407 .4541
Currency Trans. .2452 .2376 .2039 .0274 0
Welfare Cost 0 .0241 .3177 2.5734 3.0297
Cost to R.A. 0 .0018 .0048 .0184 .0207
Cost to R.N. 0 -.0027 .-0048 -.0023 -.0016
29Table 2: ½ = :05
Annual In‡ation Rate -3.94% 10% 100% 1500% >non-mon. threshold
Mean Exp. Utility .6092 .6064 .5843 .5689 .5685
S.D. of Exp. Utility .1411 .1419 .1365 .0349 .0256
S.D. of Consumption .3738 .3566 .2091 .5270 .6014
Currency Trans. .4930 .4978 .5128 .3151 0
Welfare Cost 0 .4300 14.92 1102 2006
Cost to R.A. 0 .0046 .0417 .0684 .0692
Cost to R.N. 0 -.0067 -.0564 -.0167 .0028
30Fig. 1.
31Fig. 2.
32Fig. 3.
33Fig. 4.
34Fig. 5.
35Fig. 6.
36